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Informant Reliability Analysis
Morgan Chandler
I. INTRODUCTION
“Citizen informants can provide useful information and play an
important role in law enforcement. At the same time, however, it is
imperative to recognize the potential for abuse if the information provided
by a citizen informant is not reliable.”1 This statement provides context for
the central conflict of City of Missoula v. Tye,2 in which the Montana
Supreme Court held that fabricated information from a 911 caller was
sufficiently reliable to establish particularized suspicion for an
investigative stop of a suspected impaired driver.3 The Court applied a
three-factor test previously articulated in the 1997 case of State v. Pratt4
to assess whether the 911 caller’s report containing fabricated information
was reliable.5
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Defendant, Brieana Tye (“Tye”), was charged with
aggravated driving under the influence (“DUI”) in Missoula Municipal
Court.6 Tye filed a motion to suppress evidence on the basis that the
officers lacked particularized suspicion to stop her.7 The Municipal Court
denied Tye’s motion.8 Tye then appealed the Municipal Court’s decision
to the Fourth Judicial District Court.9
Tye was arrested pursuant to a 911 call from a citizen informant
who reported a possible drunk driver.10 The informant, Rami Haddad
(“Haddad”), told the 911 dispatcher that while he was driving on Hillview
Way, he observed a vehicle pull out in front of him and swerve across the
road.11 Haddad reported to the dispatcher that he was unable to provide a
physical description of the driver or the vehicle’s license plate number.12
Haddad stated that he was willing to be contacted by law enforcement and
1

State v. Pratt, 951 P.2d 37, 42 (Mont. 1997).
372 P.3d 1286 (Mont. 2016).
3
Id.
4
951 P.2d 37.
5
Tye, 372 P.3d at 1289 (citing Pratt, 951 P.2d at 42).
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id. at 1288.
11
Id.
12
Id.
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“possibly” sign a complaint if the vehicle was located.13 Although Haddad
provided his first name, last name, and phone number to the 911
dispatcher, he declined to provide his residential address.14
Officers located a vehicle matching the description provided by
Haddad in his 911 report.15 When the officers conducted an investigative
stop and made contact with Tye, she was standing near her parked
vehicle.16 During their encounter with Tye, the officers observed that “she
was swaying, had watery eyes, slow slurred speech, and smelled of
alcohol.”17 Based on Tye’s apparent intoxication, officers arrested her.18
The officers soon discovered that Haddad had fabricated the
information he reported to the 911 dispatcher.19 Haddad admitted that he
did not observe Tye driving but called 911 from his residence after Tye
drove away from his home intoxicated.20 Haddad explained that he had
fabricated the information he provided to 911 because he was friends with
Tye and did not want her to know he was the complainant.21
Tye appeared and pled not guilty to the DUI charge in Missoula
Municipal Court.22 Tye subsequently moved to suppress all evidence
obtained from her contact with the officers, contending that the officers
lacked particularized suspicion to initiate an investigative stop because the
911 report contained fabricated information and the tip was thus
unreliable.23 The Missoula Municipal Court denied Tye’s motion to
suppress, concluding that the officers “reasonably relied” on the
information provided by Haddad, even though some of that information
was fabricated.24 Tye appealed the lower court’s order to the district court,
which affirmed the municipal court’s decision.25 Tye then appealed to the
Montana Supreme Court.26
Tye argued on appeal that the officers lacked particularized
suspicion to stop her under the Pratt test.27 The Montana Supreme Court
examined the record independently from the district court’s decision and
affirmed the lower court’s decision under a clearly erroneous standard of
review.28 The Court held that Haddad’s report was reliable in accordance
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with Pratt and its progeny and that it established the requisite
particularized suspicion for the officers to stop Tye.29
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article II, § 11 of the Montana Constitution protect individuals against
unreasonable searches and seizures.30 These constitutional protections also
extend to investigative stops, which must be justified by “particularized
suspicion.”31 In Montana, a peace officer is authorized to stop a vehicle
when the officer has a particularized suspicion that an occupant of that
vehicle has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.32
Particularized suspicion includes “(1) objective data and articulable facts
from which [a peace officer] can make certain reasonable inferences and
(2) a resulting suspicion that the person to be stopped has committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense.”33 To determine whether or
not particularized suspicion existed at the time of the stop, a court must
consider the totality of the circumstances, “including the quantity and
quality of the information available to the officer at the time of the stop.”34
When an informant’s report provides the basis for an officer’s
particularized suspicion, the report must contain “some indicia of
reliability.”35 In Montana, the standard for evaluating the reliability of an
informant’s report was set forth in Pratt.36 In Pratt, the defendant
challenged the reliability of information provided by an informant, a gas
station employee who believed the defendant was intoxicated when he
observed him enter the gas station and called to report him to the police.37
The employee provided specific information regarding the defendant’s
vehicle and the direction in which it was travelling. 38 Based on the
employee’s report, officers stopped and arrested the defendant.39 The
Court found the employee to be a reliable informant and upheld the stop
of the defendant as lawful, adopting a three-factor test to assess the
reliability of an informant’s report.40 Under this test, a court must
consider: (1) whether the informant exposed herself to criminal or civil
liability by providing identifying information to law enforcement; (2)
29

Id. at 1289–1292.
Id. at 1289.
31
Id. at 1289–1290 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-55-401(1) (2015)).
32
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-401(1); State v. Gopher, 631 P.2d 293 (Mont. 1981).
33
State v. Marcial, 308 P.3d 69, 74 (Mont. 2013) (quoting State v. Wagner, 303 P.3d 285, 288 (Mont.
2013)).
34
Tye, 372 P.3d at 1290 (citing City of Missoula v. Moore, 251 P.3d 679, 684 (Mont. 2011)).
35
Moore, 251 P.3d at 684 (quoting Pratt, 951 P.2d at 42).
36
Pratt, 952 P.2d at 42.
37
Id. at 39.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 42.
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whether the informant’s personal observations provide the basis for the
informant’s report, and; (3) whether the officer’s own observations
corroborated the informant’s observations.41
In Tye, the Court held that Haddad was a reliable informant.42 The
Court determined that the first and second Pratt factors were met. Haddad
had provided his name and phone number to the 911 dispatcher, and the
officers reasonably inferred that the informant’s detailed report was based
on his personal observations.43 Additionally, the Court determined that the
third Pratt factor was satisfied because officers corroborated the
“innocent” details of the informant’s report, such as the defendant’s
vehicle color, make, model, and location.44
A. The Pratt Factors
Informant reports are both useful and important to law
enforcement, but the Court has expressed concern about the “potential for
abuse” that may arise from officers acting upon unreliable reports.45
Unlike previous applications of Pratt, the Court in Tye was forced to
wrestle with a troubling fact: Haddad, motivated by his own interests,
fabricated his personal observations when reporting a possible DUI, and
the officer relied on this fabricated information to conduct an investigative
stop and ultimately an arrest. While the Court appropriately applied the
Pratt factors in Tye, this case marks the first time the Court dealt with an
informant whose fabricated personal observations led to a fruitful
investigation. As a result, the Tye holding stretches the traditional Pratt
analysis to allow an officer to reasonably rely on a fabricated 911 report,
which seems to be the type of situation the Court cautioned against in
Pratt.
1.

The First Pratt Factor

In assessing an informant’s reliability, a court must first consider
whether or not the informant identified himself to law enforcement, “and
thus expose[d] himself to criminal and civil liability if the report is false.”46
Information provided by an informant may form the basis for
particularized suspicion to justify an investigative stop.47 Tye argued that
Haddad did not satisfy the first Pratt factor because he declined to provide

41

Tye, 372 P.3d at 1290 (citing Pratt, 951 P.2d at 42–43).
Id. at 1290.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 1291 (citing Moore, 251 P.3d at 685).
45
Pratt, 951 P.2d at 42.
46
Tye, 372 P.3d at 1290 (citing Pratt, 951 P.2d at 42–43).
47
Pratt, 951 P.2d at 41 (citing Boland v. State, 792 P.2d 1 (Mont. 1990); State v. Ellinger, 725 P.2d
1201 (Mont. 1986)).
42
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his residential address to the 911 dispatcher.48 However, the Court has
“consistently held that an informant exposes himself to criminal and civil
liability when he identifies himself to a 911 dispatcher,” which Haddad
did by providing his name and phone number.49 While Haddad declined to
provide his address and was hesitant to sign a complaint, he had
sufficiently satisfied the initial Pratt factor by providing his name and
phone number to the 911 dispatcher.
2.

The Second Pratt Factor

An informant is considered reliable when his or her report “is
based on . . . personal observations.”50 Additionally, an informant is
presumed to be telling the truth when he or she “is motivated by good
citizenship and [is] willing to disclose the circumstances by which the
incriminating information became known.”51 In Tye, the Court relied on
its previous decision in City of Missoula v. Moore52 to find that the second
Pratt factor was satisfied.53 However, Tye is factually distinguishable from
Moore. In Moore, the informant’s tip was not fabricated. The defendant
drove to a friend’s home, smelling of alcohol, and the friend called 911 to
report the defendant.54 The friend reported that she observed the defendant
get into her vehicle, and she provided dispatch with details such as the
car’s make, model, and color, and the direction in which she was driving.55
Additionally, the defendant’s husband, who personally observed the
defendant’s driving, also called 911 to report her driving while intoxicated,
and he provided his full name, phone number, and home address.56 In
Moore, the Court determined that “an informant’s belief that a person is
DUI must be based, in part, on his or her personal observations.”57
The Court also cited Navarette v. California,58 a case in which the
United States Supreme Court held that information from an anonymous
911 caller was sufficiently reliable to establish particularized suspicion for
investigative stops.59 The Naverette factors set forth by the Supreme Court
“weighed in favor of finding the caller’s information reliable” if the caller
claimed personal knowledge of the dangerous driving by providing
specific information regarding the vehicle and driving behavior, the report
was “substantially contemporaneous” with the caller’s personal
48

Tye, 372 P.3d at 1290.
Id.
50
Id. (citing Pratt, 951 P.2d at 42–43).
51
Moore, 251 P.3d at 684 (quoting State v. Martinez, 67 P.3d 207 (Mont. 2003)).
52
251 P.3d 679 (Mont. 2011).
53
Moore, 251 P.3d at 684.
54
Id. at 681.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 684 (citing State v. Clawson, 212 P.3d 1056 (Mont. 2009)).
58
Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014).
59
Tye, 372 P.3d at 1290 (citing Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1687–88).
49
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observations, and the caller used the 911 system, which has certain
safeguards in place if the report is determined later to be false.60 In Tye,
the Court concluded that Navarette is consistent with Pratt and its progeny
because its test for reliability looks to whether “the informant’s report is
based on personal observations.”61
Here, Haddad benefitted from the presumption that an informant
is telling the truth at the time he made his report. However, Haddad was
not truthful about how he knew what he knew. Haddad’s report that Tye
was DUI was in part motivated by good citizenship, but the actual
information he provided the 911 dispatcher was not derived from his
personal observations, and it was motivated by Haddad’s personal
interests in his friendship with Tye. This is distinguishable from both
Moore and Navarette, where the informants’ reports contained
information regarding their actual personal observations of the defendants.
Furthermore, the Moore informants provided their full names, addresses,
and telephone numbers.62 Here, Haddad declined to provide his address.63
While Haddad did observe Tye before calling 911, Haddad fabricated not
only his location and Tye’s location but also his personal observations of
Tye’s impaired driving.64 Despite Haddad’s fabrications, the Court
correctly recognized that the officers, unaware of the untruthfulness of the
report, were not required to personally assess the reliability of Haddad’s
report at the time of the stop.65
In Moore, the Court also concluded that an officer may infer that
a report is based on an informant’s personal observations “‘if the report
contains sufficient detail that it is apparent that the informant has not been
fabricating the report . . . and the report is of the sort which in common
experience may be recognized as having been obtained in a reliable
way.’”66 Haddad was able to report the approximate location, make,
model, color, and “gold badging” of Tye’s vehicle, but he claimed he was
unable to see the license plate or identify Tye’s specific physical features.67
Nevertheless, the Court decided that the inconsistencies in Haddad’s
report did not weigh against his reliability because “there was no
indication that Haddad was fabricating the information in his report” at the
time of the stop, and so the officers were correct to rely on his
information.68 It is certainly plausible based on the level of detail in
Haddad’s report that he personally observed Tye driving while
intoxicated. The Court was correct in finding that, although Haddad’s was
60

Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1689.
Tye, 372 P.3d at 1291 (citing Moore, 251 P.3d at 684; Pratt, 951 P.2d at 42–43).
Moore, 360 Mont. at 23.
63
Tye, 372 P.3d at 1288.
64
Id. at 1289.
65
Pratt, 951 P.2d at 44.
66
Moore, 251 P.3d at 684 (quoting Pratt, 951 P.2d at 42).
67
Tye, 372 P.3d at 1288.
68
Id. at 1291.
61
62
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not entirely truthful, the officers appropriately presumed that his report
was truthful because it was not apparent at the time of the stop that his
personal observations were fabricated.
3.

The Third Pratt Factor

In assessing the reliability of an informant’s tip, a court also
considers whether an officer’s own observations “corroborate the
informant’s information.”69 Under the third Pratt factor, an officer may
“corroborate an informant’s report by observing illegal activity or by
finding ‘the person, the vehicle, and the vehicle’s location substantially as
described by the informant.’”70 If the first two Pratt factors are satisfied,
an officer may corroborate an informant’s personal observations by
“‘observing wholly innocent behavior.’”71
In Tye, the officers were only able to rely upon the innocent details
of Haddad’s report.72 Haddad provided the vehicle’s description, its
approximate location, and its direction of travel.73 Because the first two
Pratt factors were satisfied, the Court correctly found that this innocent
information was sufficient for the officers to corroborate the entirety of
Haddad’s report.74
B. Expanding the Scope of the Pratt Analysis
Informant reliability has regularly been challenged in Montana,
but the Court has consistently found that an informant is reliable when her
report is actually based on her personal observations.75 Tye marks the first
time the Court determined that an informant is reliable even though his
report was based on fabricated personal observations. Because of Tye’s
unique facts, the Court had to reconcile the requirements of particularized
suspicion with a facially reliable informant whose report was later found
to be fabricated. Tye’s holding has ultimately expanded the scope of Pratt
and its progeny, and thus expanded the scope of particularized suspicion.
Tye allows officers to develop particularized suspicion from a reasonable
reliance on an informant’s fabricated report.
69

Id. at 1290 (citing Pratt, 951 P.2d at 42–43).
Id. at 1291 (citing Moore, 251 P.3d at 685 (quoting Pratt, 951 P.2d at 45)).
71
Id. at 1291 (quoting Moore, 251 P.3d at 685).
72
Id. at 1288.
73
Id. at 1291–1292.
74
Id.
75
See e.g. Moore, 251 P.3d 679; Clawson, 212 P.3d at 1059 (holding that an informant was reliable
when she adequately identified herself and her location and the information she provided was based
upon her actual observations of the defendant); See also State v. Gill, 272 P.3d 60, 64-66 (Mont. 2012)
(holding that an informant’s actual personal observations regarding the defendant’s vehicle hitting a
concrete barrier provided sufficient justification for the officer’s stop); See also State v. Rutherford,
208 P.3d 389 (Mont. 2009) (holding that an informant was reliable because she provided a detailed
and specific report of the defendant’s impaired driving, which was based on her actual personal
observations).
70
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When the officers stopped Tye, they were permitted under Moore
to reasonably infer that Haddad’s report was based on his personal
observations because there was “objective information available to both
[them] and the 911 dispatcher,” including an identified informant who had
called 911 to “report that he was driving behind a drunk driver and
provided a detailed description of the vehicle.”76 The Court determined
that the detail in Haddad’s report, “the contemporaneity of his report with
the event he allegedly was observing, and his use of the 911 system all
weigh[ed] in favor of finding his information reliable.”77
IV. CONCLUSION
In Pratt, the Court recognized the frequency with which courts
and law enforcement encounter issues involving reports from citizen
informants, and it sought to provide guidance on the proper use of
informant reports.78 Tye is certainly not the first case the Court has decided
in which an informant’s reliability has been challenged. However, Tye is
unique because, unlike previous cases such as Pratt and Moore, the Court
found reliable an informant whose report was based on fabricated personal
observations. While Haddad may have observed Tye prior to calling 911,
no part of Haddad’s 911 report was based on his personal observations.
However, at the time of the stop Haddad’s report appeared reliable. It was
only after Tye’s arrest that officers found out Haddad was untruthful about
his observations. While this fact may be troubling, the Court was
constrained in its holding by the rules articulated by the Pratt line of cases.
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Tye, 372 P.3d at 1291.
Id.
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Pratt, 951 P.2d at 42.
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